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Hierarchies of rights programme
• Hierarchies of rights: land and investments in Africa (2015-
2019)
• Comparative first two later three countries: Moz, Taz and 
Uga
• Large scale investments in three sectors: agriculture
(rice/sugar), coal and oil/gas/pipelines
• Capacity building component: PhDs, cross learning 
land/rights and governance/political economy – strong
network building with ESID
• Focus on implementation of investments and 
accommodation of rights – based on the need for economic
transformation and ideas related to fairness
The literature
• Generally the literature explore one relation, sometimes hint at two relations
• Land grab
• Focus on (non)accommodation of rights Investor-local population relationship 
• Investor-ruling elite relationship - Ruling elite being bought by investors
• Resource curse 
• Focus on implementation and negative impact of investments on general economic development
• Investor-ruling elite relationship - Focus on corruption, ‘comprador’, collusion
• CSR
• Focus on implementation primarily from the investor’s perspective - CSR
• Investor-local population relationship CSR focus on standards, guidelines and codes of conduct
• Political settlement
• Focus on Ruling elites and lower level factions within; focus on  investors and bureaucracy – rarely local 
populations that are neither opposition nor factions within
• We argue that in order to understand both implementation of investments and 
accommodation of rights, we need to take into account all three relationships:
• Investors-ruling elites
• Investors-local populations











Characteristics when rights and implementation actually takes place
Characteristics of the three relationships
• Compatible interests (ruling elites and investors) – exchange of security, property 
rights, protection etc. – in exchange for rents, revenues, foreign exchange, jobs
• Without some kind of compatible interest large-scale investments rarely take place at all –
but is it the most important relationship? (Political settlement approach - Khan)
• Reciprocal exchange deal (local populations and investors) – give up land and/or 
livelihood, accept pollution of the environment etc. in exchange for 
compensation, resettlement, provision of social services, jobs, economic 
opportunities 
• Can create a degree of acceptance of the investments (contractual underpinning or informal) 
but based on continual exchanges combined with the ongoing making of claims 
(Exchange/Mauss)
• Mutual recognition (ruling elites and local populations) – based on a series of 
exchanges that can be short- or long-term in nature, where for example services 
can be exchanged for electoral support 
• If mutual recognition is achieved, it can make changes in property institutions, which govern 
the distribution of economic benefits, accepted in return for desired services and/or 
protection from abuse by investors or other actors. However, the relationship can take 
different forms (coercive, dismissive or productive) (Social contract theory – Nugent, Lavers-
Hickey)
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Arbitration and mediation 


















































General patterns: 1 
• Public-private-partnerships involving SOEs create challenges for rights 
protection as ‘state’ has a double role                 Nagaka coal mine Taz; 
Wanbao rice in Moz; Mnazi gas in Taz etc.
• Temporal dimension – time and rights – a gradual shift of the type rights 
that matter as an investment progresses over time – rights becomes 
relational: land to procedural rights; land to socio-economic opportunities 
etc.
• Examples: Rice/sugar in Mozambique/Tanzania, compensation in gas, coal in 
Tanzania
• Rights become more important over time for investors – increasing need 
for stability (reduced conflict) and reputational risks for international 
investors (CSR, standards, etc.)
• Examples: Gas in both Tanzania and Mozambique, agriculture takes time so need 
stability – inclusion through outgrower schemes
General patterns: 2
• Expected outcome with regard to implementation and rights are 
more mixed in agriculture than in extractives (where implementation 
is pushed by ruling elites)                 because of the relative importance 
for ruling elites and regime survival/reproduction
• In Tanzania there have been struggles between IOCs and government 
on compensation standards where government is more restrictive 
and insist on national standards inscribed in national law 
• In Mozambique international compensation standards have been 
turned into national law, accommodating gas investments, but also 
violated at least in the case of coal and most agricultural investments. 
So on paper, Mozambique is today formally better for local 
populations, but in practice a different story
General patterns: 3
• Local populations are not just hapless victims as Uganda (Amuru
sugar works) and in part Tanzania (coal, rice and gas) illustrates, but 
clear difference to Mozambique where they are less accommodated –
why does local populations rarely matter in Mozambique?
• Electoral democracy plays an important (but different) role, 
particularly in Tanzania and Uganda compared to Mozambique – i.e. 
mutual recognition is important for the ruling elite in Tanzania and 
Uganda for their own idea about regime legitimacy and ability to 
mobilise and persuade potential voters but not really in Mozambique 
where the regime through state institutional control can manipulate 
elections
• Democracy and electoral systems affect holding power of local populations
General patterns: 4 
• Mutual recognition or rather misrecognition by the state and ruling
elite of local populations drive conflicts related to natural resource
investments
• Less investments that are criticised but they become easy prey and 
are easy to criticise when investment deals are not considered fair to 
or by local populations (procedural inclusion seems very important
for the legitimacy of investments)
• History matter – neglection, war, exploitation etc. have important
consequences for how investments coming on the back on ruling
elites are viewed: 
• Uganda and Mozambique in particular, but also Tanzania provide important
illustrations of this dilemma
General patterns: 5
• Clear patterns of Differentiation - parts of the local population 
improve their livelihood, sometimes considerably when outgrower
schemes works
• We see increased intra-elite competition over access to resources and 
rents
• Ruling elites becomes dependent on extractive investments: export, currency, rents –
less so with the agricultural investments (takes too long time to mature) 
• Clear differences between sugar and rice due to investor characteristics and 
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*Complex as all three
relationships and 
their characteristics
need to come
together
